Bueno, pero los fondos se podrían transferir a la aviación civil. ¿Cuantos paises operan aviones estratégicos modernos hoy en día? Francia y el Reino Unido dejaron morir sus Mirage-IV y Vulcan.
En general y por los artículos que he leído esa institución / revista / web es bastante crítica con Putin... y la verdad ni me sorprende ni me extraña... hay que ser muy muy muy proclive al tito Putin para creerse sus numerosas (cortinas) humaredas verborreicas futuribles...
En general suelen estar muy bien informados, y es una buena fuente para la gente que no domina el ruso.
El artículo técnicamente no se puede ver, hay que buscar un poco por google. Lo copio y pego.
PAK DA – The White Elephant of Russian AviationMikhail Barabanov
Russia’s next–generation long range bomber program, the PAK DA (Future Long Range Aviation Complex) is one of the most ambitious components of the recently adopted State Armament Program for 2011-2020. But in early 2012 discussions began about the possibility of cuts in spending on the extremely costly SAP program; many believe that the PAK DA will be affected as well.
Russia and the United States are currently the only two countries in the world to operate strategic bombers. As of early 2012, the Russian fleet consisted of 63 Tu-95MS turboprop subsonic heavy bombers, and 13 Tu-160 supersonic heavy bomber, of which 55 and 11 aircraft, respectively, were in an operational condition.1
These aircraft are relatively new, by heavy bomber standards. All the Tu-95MS were built between 1981 and 1993. Out of the 13 Tu-160 aircraft, 11 were built between 1986 and 1994, one was delivered in 1999, and one in 2007. The Russian strategic aviation fleet was spending very little time in the air in the 1990s and early 2000s, so most of these bombers still have a lot of mileage in them – enough in fact to remain in service for decades.
Nevertheless, in recent years the MoD has been hard at work on the PAK DA program. The Air Force says there is a clear need for a new-generation heavy bomber because the existing Tu-95MS and Tu-160 aircraft no longer meet the modern, let alone future requirements.
The Tu-95MS is essentially just a flying platform which allows long-range cruise missiles to be launched from outside the range of the adversary’s air defenses. The archaic design of the aircraft (dating back to the early 1950s) and its turboprop engines make it relatively slow and highly visible to the enemy’s radars. As for the Tu-160, it has failed to live up to the promise of its designers, who envisaged it as a truly versatile aircraft. Owing to the limitations of its design and onboard systems which emerged after the bomber entered service, it has almost never been used to stealthily approach the target at extra-low altitudes. The only role for which it is well-suited is to carry cruise missiles at high speed and high altitude. As a result, the Tu-160 cannot be used for deep penetration into areas protected by competent air defenses.
The Russian Air Force therefore has an unmet need for a modern heavy bomber capable of reaching remote and well-protected targets, and attacking them using a broad range of high-precision nuclear or conventional airborne weapons. Another capability a future heavy bomber must have is to take on the enemy’s ships, especially American aircraft carriers and carrier groups, replacing the existing fleet of the Tu-22M3 long-range bombers.
The launch of the PAK DA programEarly development of future strategic and long-range striker aircraft began in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The Sukhoi design bureau worked on the T-60 long-range bomber project. The Tupolev bureau had several futuristic projects, including flying wing-type and hypersonic planes.
The break-up of the Soviet Union and the ensuing drastic cuts in defense spending appeared to have spelt the end of all those programs. Nevertheless, in 1999 the Russian Air Force’s R&D centers began to draw up the outlines and the list of requirements for a new “fifth-generation” strategic bomber, designated as the PAK DA. (Another major Air Force program was the PAK FA, the Future Tactical Aviation Complex, which has already delivered the T-50 fighter prototype designed by Sukhoi.) At about the same time the Russian aircraft design bureaus launched tentative new heavy bomber projects.
A large increase in Russian spending on defense, including military R&D, after 2005 enabled the PAK DA program to reach the practical implementation phase. Development of a new heavy bomber was included in the State Armament Program for 2007-2015, which was approved in 2006. In April 2007 the Russian Air Force announced a competition for a conceptual PAK DA design, and formulated a list of design specifications and requirements to the new bomber. In 2008 work on the early PAK DA designs began to receive state financing.
The competition for the PAK DA conceptual design contract involved two frontrunners, Sukhoi and Tupolev, and two clear outsiders, the Ilyushin and the Myasishchev bureaus. It is believed that Sukhoi proposed the new version T-60 project. But Tupolev came out the winner, and in August 2009 the Russian MoD signed a three-year contract with the company to flesh out the PAK DA project.2 In December 2009 Tupolev CEO Aleksandr Bobryshev said that the PAK DA research and development phase would be completed in 2012, whereupon the company would commence the detailed design and engineering phase, to be completed in 2017. He added that the plan was to build and supply the Russian Air Force with 100 PAK DA aircraft by 2027.3
Under the terms of the contract, a detailed PAK DA design concept was to be completed in the first half of 2012, based on which further decisions about the specifics of the project were to be made. According to the then deputy defense minister, Vladimir Popovkin, the engineering design of the new bomber was to be completed by 2015.4
The PAK DA became part of the extremely ambitious State Armament Program for 2011-2020 (SAP-2020), approved by President Dmitry Medvedev in December 2010. In December 2011 the Long Range Aviation commander, Maj Gen Anatoliy Zhikharev, said that the Air Force command had issued the final list of requirements and specifications for the PAK DA, and that work on that program was “actively under way”. He went on to provide further details: “The first flying prototype of the aircraft will appear in 2020. It may enter service with Long Range Aviation in 2025. We would like it to be equipped with a radically new targeting and navigation system, as well as advanced communication, reconnaissance and radio-electronic warfare capability. It must be capable of using all the existing types of airborne weapons, and all the future types that will enter service with Long Range Aviation.” He added that the new bomber was required to have a low radar profile.5
In February 2012 the Russian Air Force commander, Col Gen Aleksandr Zelin, confirmed that the early PAK DA design had been completed, and said that the aircraft was expected to enter service “with a radically new Russian Air Force” some time in the 2030s.6
Emerging uncertaintiesIn the first half of 2012, however, Russia’s top military-political leadership began to debate the need for the PAK DA program; on a number of occasions these discussions leaked into the public domain. The explanation for this uncertainty is three-fold. First, the three-year contract with Tupolev for the early conceptual PAK DA design has been completed, presenting the government with the need to approve massive spending on the engineering design and development phase. Second, the Russian defense industry has a new government supervisor, Dmitry Rogozin, who was recently appointed first deputy prime minister and chairman of the Defense Industry Commission. And third, the Russian leadership has quietly begun to contemplate the possibility that it may be forced to cut defense spending, including spending on the SAP-2020 program.
Since his appointment Dmitry Rogozin has taken stock of the ongoing defense programs, and come to doubt the need for an expensive new strategic bomber. Speaking in an interview with the leading Russian broadsheet Izvestiya in early June 2012, he had this to say: “Look at the current level of air defense and missile defense capability. None of these planes will be allowed to reach their target. Our planes aren’t going to reach their targets, and vice versa. We must think about entirely new approaches.” He added that in his opinion Russia’s long range aviation had no future “in a traditional sense”, i.e. as one of the instruments of delivering a nuclear strike against the potential adversary”.7
Since that statement Rogozin has reiterated, on several occasions, his view that there is no point in developing a new strategic bomber to replace the Tu-95MS and the Tu-160. “I am ready to defend my point of view,” the deputy prime minister said. “Given the current level of air defense and missile defense capability, these aircraft will be destroyed before they have a chance to reach their targets.”8
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the chief of the General Staff, Gen Nikolay Makarov, have both voiced their support for the PAK DA. The newly-elected president, Vladimir Putin, was forced to intervene in this public debate. Speaking in mid-June at a meeting to discuss the deliveries on the state defense procurement program, he also backed the PAK DA. “We are about to launch the development of the future long-range aviation system, the PAK DA,” the president said. “I am well aware of how costly and complicated this will be. We have repeatedly discussed this with the minister and with the chief of the General Staff. This is a complicated task in terms of science and technology, but we need to get down to this work.” He added that unless work on the project began on schedule, Russia would “miss the window of opportunity”.9
Putin’s backing for the program appears to have put an end to the debate; the decision to launch the PAK DA program in earnest has been approved. Rogozin has backtracked in a very public manner by saying that he is “in favor of the PAK DA, but it must not be a copy of the B-2. We need to look further and develop hypersonic long-range aircraft, both military and civilian”.10 The outcome of the fray over the PAK DA has demonstrated that, for all his impressive job titles, Rogozin simply lacks the political weight to take on the MoD and the defense industry lobby.
In late June the new Air Force commander, Maj Gen Viktor Bondarev, said that the basic design of the PAK DA bomber was “already formed” (probably meaning that it has been approved) and that work was under way on the final details of the specifications.11 Shortly afterwards the acting deputy Air Force commander, Aleksandr Chernyayev, confirmed earlier plans by saying that “the first PAK DA units [probably referring to first prototypes] will be delivered to the Air Force by about 2020”.12
What the PAK DA may look likeAll information about the possible design and specifications of the PAK DA is being kept secret. Even the overall concept and general layout of the plane have not been disclosed. Judging from the experience of the PAK FA fighter program, such secrecy can be expected to continue until the maiden flight of the main prototype.
Several observers had previously speculated that the PAK DA would be little more than a radical upgrade of the existing Tu-160 design. But in June 2012 the chief of General Staff, Gen Makarov, said that the PAK DA would have “an entirely new airframe”.13 We believe that given the key requirement for the new bomber to be versatile and to have a low radar profile, the PAK DA will in fact have to be a completely new design. It will probably look like an oversized fifth-generation fighter and have supersonic cruising capability, with an estimated range of up to 12,000 km.
The bomber will carry a broad range of high-precision conventional weapons, long-range cruise missiles armed with nuclear and conventional warheads, and, quite likely, various future hypersonic and aeroballistic missiles.
One of the main problems facing the PAK DA program (as well as many other Russian aerospace programs) is the availability of engines. It is known that the MoD wants the bomber to be equipped with a new turbofan engine with a thrust of 25-30 tonnes, to be developed by Kuznetsov (Samara) based on the design of the future PD-30 engine, previously designated as the NK-65. The core of the PD-30 will be borrowed from the modified NK-32M, a new version of the NK-32 turbofan engine for the Tu-160 bombers, to be launched by Kuznetsov for a Tu-160 retrofitting program. The PD-30 should be geared turbofan with a large fan. The PAK DA engine will not be identical to the PD-30; it will have the same core, but probably a smaller fan and an afterburner.14
Kuznetsov, however, is known to be facing serious problems not only with the NK-32M development but even with resuming the manufacture of the old NK-32 engines to keep the existing Tu-160 fleet in the air. According to current projections, the first NK-32 engines will be made in Samara in 2014-2016 at the very earliest.15 There are grave doubts about the industry’s ability to bring the PD-30 engine to production status within a reasonable time frame, and to develop an engine for the PAK DA using the core PD-30 design.
Uncertain outlookThe program to develop a radically new long-range heavy bomber will clearly require a monumental R&D effort and huge amounts of money. Many observers are therefore extremely skeptical about Russia’s ability to muster the technological, industrial and economic resources the PAK DA program will require to deliver a decent result. Judging from the statements by Dmitry Rogozin, the Russian defense industry captains are not uniformly optimistic, either.
The PAK DA will have to overcome the two fundamental challenges which face the entire SAP-2020 program: Russia’s uncertain ability to find the 19 trillion roubles the SAP 2020 program will cost, and grave doubts as to whether the constituent weapons programs can be delivered on budget.
Ever since the beginning of 2012 the government has been preparing for the eventuality of serious cuts in defense spending, especially spending on the SAP-2012. In July 2012 it was reported that a preliminary agreement had been reached to cut defense procurement in 2013-2015. In 2013 the previously slated figures will be cut by 200bn roubles, in 2014 by 251.3bn, and in 2015 by 248.7bn. Previously Deputy Defense Minister Aleksandr Sukhorukov said that the government would spend 1,240bn roubles on defense procurement in 2013, 1,500bn in 2014, and at least 2,000bn in 2015. That translates into a reduction of 16 per cent in 2013, almost 17 per cent in 2014, and about 12.5 per cent in 2015.16
Even deeper cuts may well be announced later on, and the government is unlikely to disburse the whole 19 trillion roubles it had originally budgeted for the SAP-2020. The situation does not come as a surprise. The spending plans set out in the program were hugely ambitious and entirely at odds with Russia’s modest economic growth figures, which have been hovering around 3-4 per cent in recent years, with a negative outlook owing to the continuing global economic instability. To generate enough revenue for programs such as the SAP-2020, the Russian economy needs to grow at Chinese rates. That is something the economic system President Putin has built is entirely unable to deliver. The best it can do is low single digits, with a recurring prospect of contraction. Vladimir Putin has failed to modernize the Russian economic system and kick-start healthy growth, so there is simply not enough money in the treasury to finance the SAP-2020.
As the prospect of reigning in the scope of the program becomes inevitable, questions are being raised as to where exactly the axe will fall. The PAK DA is extravagantly expensive and will not deliver a usable product for at least a decade, so it appears to be one of the prime candidates. The Russian political leadership probably cannot muster enough political will to cancel the PAK DA altogether – but its financing will have to be slashed, raising further questions about the feasibility of its deadlines (which were never very realistic to begin with).
A compounding factor is that the existing projections for the PAK DA budget also appear overly optimistic, even before the expected cuts are factored in. There are serious suspicions that many of the constituent programs of the SAP-2020 will cost a lot more than the existing calculations would have us believe, and the MoD knows it. The SAP 2020 may well end up costing 30 trillion or even 40 trillion roubles. For now, however, even the currently budgeted 19 trillion is more than Russia can afford to spend. The Russian aerospace R&D programs are especially prone to coming in over budget. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union almost all such programs have ended up costing at least twice as much as originally budgeted; suffice to recall the Sukhoi Superjet SSJ100 program. The problem is not unique to Russia; it plagues weapons project planning in every developed country, including the United States.
It is therefore clear that the PAK DA is unlikely to receive sufficient funding, given Russia’s economic situation. Owing to a combination of financial and technical problems the program will probably fall well behind schedule. As a result, from time to time the PAK DA will come under massive political pressure and balance on the brink of closure. But the Russian government’s great-power ambitions may well help the program to survive nonetheless, with new moneys being thrown at it in each consecutive budget. Essentially, the PAK DA could degenerate into a typical graft-ridden state program, kept afloat for political motives, costing Russia an arm and a leg, and with any tangible deliverables always just beyond the horizon. Gen Zelin’s cautious projection of the new heavy bombers entering service with the Russian Air Force “some time in the 2030s” therefore looks fairly realistic, and maybe even a bit optimistic.
Finally, even if the PAK DA manages to deliver a minimally usable aircraft, it is not at all certain that the Russian Air Force will be able to buy them in large enough numbers. Owing to their astronomical price tag, the new bombers will probably become the Air Force’s very own white elephants, with only a few units bought for political and PR motives.
The PAK DA appears to be one of Russia’s most questionable, risky and unnecessary defense programs. It will inevitably cost a fortune, which could be usefully spent on much more pressing defense needs. The sole reason for the existence of this program is to underpin the Russian political and military leadership’s great-power ambitions, whatever the cost, even if the actual military and economic payout of such programs is minimal.
