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Miroslav Lokar
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Kosovo je Srbija


« Respuesta #390 : 14 Septiembre 2012, 00:37:26 »

Inside Syria's War

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"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
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« Respuesta #391 : 14 Septiembre 2012, 00:39:53 »

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An armed fighter of the Free Syrian Army stands atop a destroyed Syrian army tank to have his picture taken by a passer-by in the northern Syrian town of Azaz, some 47km north of Aleppo, on September 10, 2012, as UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi admitted he faced a "very difficult" task in his bid to end the nearly 18-month conflict. AFP PHOTO/SAM TARLING

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A member of the Free Syrian Army enjoys an ice cream on the road from Azaz to Aleppo on September 10, 2012. Syrian rebels summarily executed at least 20 soldiers in second city Aleppo, a watchdog, as UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi admitted he faced a "very difficult" task in his bid to end the nearly 18-month conflict. AFP PHOTO/SAM TARLING

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A fighter with the Free Syria Army (FSA) checks the positions of forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Seif al-Dawla area in the embattled northern Syrian city of Aleppo on September 10, 2012. AFP PHOTO/ACHILLEAS ZAVALLIS

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Members of the Free Syrian Army prepare to fire their anti-aircraft machine guns in Aleppo's Al-Shaar district September 9, 2012. Picture taken September 9, 2012. *******/Zain Karam

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A member of the Free Syrian Army looks up at a jet at Aleppo's Al-Shaar district September 9, 2012. Picture taken September 9, 2012. *******/Zain Karam
En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
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« Respuesta #392 : 14 Septiembre 2012, 00:49:10 »

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A member of the Free Syrian Army shouts at his comrades to take cover as another fighter prepares to fire an overflying jet with an anti-aircraft machine gun in Aleppo's Al-Shaar district September 9, 2012. Picture taken September 9, 2012. *******/Zain Karam

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A member of the Free Syrian Army stands next to an anti-aircraft machine after firing at a jet in Aleppo's Al-Shaar district September 9, 2012. Picture taken September 9, 2012. *******/Zain Karam

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A member of the Free Syrian Army runs to take cover from a jet firing back at an anti-aircraft machine gun in Aleppo's Al-Shaar district September 9, 2012. Picture taken September 9, 2012. *******/Zain Karam

En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
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« Respuesta #393 : 14 Septiembre 2012, 00:50:52 »

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People walk past a row of destroyed buildings near the Al-Hayat Hospital in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on September 10, 2012 as UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi admitted he faced a "very difficult" task in his bid to end the nearly 18-month conflict. AFP PHOTO/STR

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A general view shows buildings destroyed in recent bombardment of a residential neighbourhood in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on September 10, 2012 as UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi admitted he faced a "very difficult" task in his bid to end the nearly 18-month conflict. AFP PHOTO/STR

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Syrian government forces take position in a residential neighbourhood in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on September 8, 2012. UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi admitted on September 10 he faced a "very difficult" task in his bid to end the nearly 18-month conflict which the Syrian government's traditional ally Moscow called for a peace conference involving all parties to the conflict, warning of the risks of a complete collapse of central authority as happened in Somalia in the early 1990s. AFP PHOTO/STR

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Destroyed vehicles are parked in front of a school damaged in recent fighting between rebels and government forces in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on September 9, 2012. UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi admitted on September 10 he faced a "very difficult" task in his bid to end the nearly 18-month conflict which the Syrian government's traditional ally Moscow called for a peace conference involving all parties to the conflict, warning of the risks of a complete collapse of central authority as happened in Somalia in the early 1990s. AFP PHOTO/STR

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A Syrian rebel aims his weapon during clashes with government forces in the Ezza district of the northern city of Aleppo on September 8, 2012. The battle for Aleppo, Syria's second largest city, has been raging since July 20, with the army unable to dislodge the rebels. AFP PHOTO/ZAC BAILLIE
En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
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« Respuesta #394 : 14 Septiembre 2012, 01:44:11 »


  Russian Interests in Syria: Myths and Reality
  Mikhail Barabanov 
 
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  Un artículo bastante bueno, recoge bastante espectro del tema... en mi opinión falta la geopolítica del petroleo y gas... a donde entra lo que es Siria para Iran...


  Lo reproduzco para por si acaso en un futuro no está disponible. (He encontrado en otro foro un artículo de esa misma web que ahora no esta visible...)

 
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The Syrian crisis is the next test of the relationship between Russia and the West. In this respect the degree of Russia’s firmness in support of the regime of Bashar Assad and Moscow’s willingness to escalate the situation with Western nations came as a surprise both to Western capitals and foreign observers, especially in light of Russia’s “acquiescence” in the foreign intervention in Libya at the beginning of 2011.

This makes clarifying the motives for the Russian response to events in Syria rather interesting. Western observers and the mass media sought in their characteristic manner to explain the Russian position by predominantly focusing on Moscow’s desire to keep its supply and maintenance base in Tartus or to profit from the sale of Russian arms to Syria. Upon closer examination, however, it is precisely these factors that appear doubtful, although it is worth examining them in greater detail.


Russian arms exports to Syria

From the mid-seventies (after Egypt “fell out” of the USSR’s orbit) Syria, as the most faithful and key ally of the USSR in the Middle East, was probably the largest recipient of Soviet weapons outside the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As a result, Syria was able to establish a strong military almost completely outfitted with relatively modern (at the time) Soviet weaponry. Moreover, shipments of arms and military equipment were made at least partially on credit.

After the collapse of the USSR, the brakes were put on military and technical cooperation (MTC) between Moscow and Syria because Damascus did not have sufficient funds of its own for new large-scale purchases of weapons, and the Russian leadership insisted that Syria acknowledge its Soviet-era debts (estimated at 13.4 billion dollars in 2005). An additional factor that complicated MTC with Syria was Russia’s desire to improve relations with Israel and with Western countries, which led to caution over shipments to Syria.

For this reason, by 1997 only insignificant contracts were under way with Syria. However, Syria keenly wanted to receive modern weapons for its large but obsolescent army and was seeking to garner Russia’s political support, and Moscow did not want to lose the Syrian market, so a compromise was struck in 1997 at a Russo-Syrian intergovernmental commission on MTC. In December 1998 this commission agreed on terms of payments for the shipment of special equipment and the provision of technical assistance. As a result, Russia was able to send Syria a large shipment of AKS-74U and AK-74M assault rifles, grenade launchers, and various types of ammunition. At the time all shipments were being made purely on a commercial basis.

In 1998-1999, the Tula Instrument Design Bureau (KBP), which at the time was a special exporter (that is, it had a license for the independent export of its goods without the need for state intermediaries) entered into a number of contracts with Syria for Metis-M (AT-13) and Kornet-E (AT 14) antitank missile systems. Later Syria made new purchases of these systems from KBP and Rosoboroneksport – it is known that in 2005 a fifth contract for the Kornet-E had already been concluded.

Between 1998 and 2001 Russia and Syria held intensive high-level talks during which the Syrians submitted purchase requests for a large quantity of various missile defense systems, combat aircraft, helicopters, armor, etc. However, in view of the fact that the Syrian debt problem had not been settled, major contracts were not concluded with the exception of relatively minor agreements to repair equipment the Syrians already had.

It was only in January 2005 that an agreement was reached to write off 70% of Syria’s foreign debt to Russia which, at that time, constituted 13.4 billion dollars. As a result of the talks it was reduced to 3.6 billion dollars. In all likelihood one of the conditions for writing off the debt was Syria’s commitment to enter into contracts for the purchase of a large shipment of Russian arms on a commercial basis at a fixed price (a method later used by Moscow with Algeria and Libya).

In January 2005 the Syrians had already concluded agreements to purchase Strelets antiaircraft modules with missiles from the Igla (SA-18 and SA-24) MANPAD system. In order to tamp down the concern of Western countries and Israel over such shipments, Russia demonstratively cancelled (supposedly on the personal instructions of Vladimir Putin) the expected contract for supplying Syria with the Iskander-E (SS-26) tactical ballistic missile system. Taking into account that the Iskander was ready for full-scale serial production no earlier than 2011, this action was, to all appearances, a transparent political ploy with the goal of persuading Israel that its concerns were being listened to while continuing shipments to Syria of less “politically provocative” arms.

Under the terms of the Russian-Syrian arrangements of 2005, in late 2006 and early 2007 Syria concluded a package of major contracts with Rosoboroneksport to purchase Russian arms worth some 4.5 billion dollars, and this defines the nature of Russian-Syrian MTC up to the present day. The signing per se of the contracts and their content was not reported publicly, and to this day the Russian authorities and Rosoboroneksport are extremely sensitive about information on these contracts, sometimes even denying their very existence. According to available data, these contracts include:


Eight MiG-31E heavy interceptor-fighters at a cost of up to 250 million dollars. This was both the first and so far the sole export contract for MiG-31 airplanes. The airplanes were supposed to be manufactured from remaining Soviet stock at the OJSC Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft-building Plant “Sokol.” Work was begun but in May of 2009 the contract was cancelled (or suspended) for political reasons – apparently, because of Israel’s concerns. Not a single plane was shipped.


Twelve MiG-29M/M2 fighters (with an option for another 12) worth up to 600 million dollars. This is the first contract for the new modification of the MiG-29 fighters that in their present form are the land-based analog of the MiG-29K carrier-based fighters being shipped to India. The work is being done by RAC MiG (JSC) which was able, with Syrian funds, to do the R&D work for the MiG-29M/M2. At the end of 2011 the MiG-29M and the MiG-29M2 (a two-seater) were built from the same development prototype, and serial production of twelve aircraft began. According to available information, the shipment of the first consignment (and possibly of even all twelve aircraft) to Syria is planned for the end of 2012. For the time being, the fate of the option for twelve more planes has not been decided. The aircraft are supposed to be supplied with air-to-air and air-to-surface aircraft guided missile armaments produced by Tactical Missiles Corporation.


Eight battalions (two brigade) of the Buk-M2E (SA 17) medium-range air defense missile system worth one billion dollars. Syria was the first customer for this modification of the air defense missile system. The contractor is the OJSC Almaz-Antey Missile Defense Concern and the manufacturer of the systems is the OJSC Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant. The first two battalions were shipped to Syria in 2010, presumably two more in 2011, and the completion of shipments is planned for 2012-2013.


Up to 12 battalions of the modernized S-125-2M Pechora-2M (SA-3B Mod) medium-range air defense missile system worth about 200 million dollars. The contractor is the Russian-Belarusian OJSC Financial and Industrial Group Defense Systems. The first four battalions were shipped to Syria in 2011 and four more were sent to Syria aboard the Alaed cargo ship in 2012.


36 launchers of the Pantsir-S1 (SA-22) missile-artillery air defense weapon system worth 700 million dollars. The manufacturer is OJSC Tula Instrument Design Bureau. Shipments of the launchers began in 2008 but so far only 12 have been shipped. The contract should be completed in 2013.


Two battalions of the K-300P Bastion-P (SSC-5) mobile coastal anti-ship missile system with 36 Yakhont K-310 (SS-N-26) supersonic anti-ship missiles worth 250 million dollars. The contractor is OJSC NPO Mashinostroyenia Corporation. One battalion was shipped in 2010, the second in 2011.


An unknown number of Khrizantema-S (AT-15) tank destroyer missile systems (on BMP-3 chassis). The contractor is the OJSC Kurganmashzavod . In all likelihood, the shipment has not yet taken place.


Shipment of Igla-S (SA-24) portable air-defense missile systems (including, possibly, the Strelets as part of a package). The manufacturer is OJSC Degtiarev Plant. Presumably, all shipments were made in 2008-2010.


Modernization of 1,000 T-72 tanks worth one billion dollars. The contractor is the OJSC Uralvagonzavod Research and Production Corporation using a Syrian repair facility. Presumably work began only in 2011 and so far substantial progress has not been made.

Subsequently, in 2007-2008 Syria concluded a number of contracts with Rosoboroneksport to repair and modernize the aviation equipment of the Syrian Air Force: 15 Su 24MK front-line bombers (the contractor is the OJSC 514th Aircraft Repair Depot in Rzhev and work began in 2010), a certain number of MiG-29 fighters in their modernized MiG-29SM version (the contractor is the OJSC MiG Russian Aircraft Construction Corporation and the first four planes were modernized in 2011), repair of a certain number of MiG 23MLD fighters (the contractors are the OJSC MiG Russian Aircraft Construction Corporation and the OJSC 275th Aircraft Repair Depot in Krasnodar, and in 2011 seven planes were repaired), and the repair of 20 Mi-25 attack helicopters and two Ka-28 anti-submarine helicopters. The first four Mi-25 helicopters were repaired by the OJSC Rostvertol in 2008, but in 2009, because of disagreements about price, the helicopter repair contract was transferred to the OJSC 150th Aircraft Repair Depot in Kaliningrad, where 16 Mi-25s and two Ka-28s were repaired by 2012 (the last three Mi-25s are supposed to be delivered to Syria on the Alaed ).

Since 2009 there has been a shipment of supersonic Kh-31A (AS-17) supersonic anti-ship missiles and Kh 31P antiradar missiles made by the OJSC Tactical Missiles Corporation (it is known that in 2009-2010, 87 missiles were shipped for a sum of 80 million dollars).

In September 2010 Syria signed a contract to supply four S-300PMU2 (SA-20B) air defense missile systems (the two parties on the two systems/battalions), produced by OJSC Concern PVO Almaz-Antey, with an estimated value of up to 800 million dollars.

Finally, in December 2011 Rosoboroneksport entered into a contract to ship 36 Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft to Syria for a minimum of 550 million dollars. However, information from the designated contractor (OJSC Irkut Corporation) says the contract has so far not been approved by the Russian government and has not gone into effect.

In 2005-2011 considerable shipments of Russian military vehicles, including Ural and Sadko trucks, were made to Syria.

Altogether, since 2006 approximately 6 billion dollars worth of contracts have been concluded with Syria for the shipment of arms and military equipment and for associated shipments and work (repair, shipments of spare parts and munitions, etc.). In this regard, Syria put the emphasis in its purchases on modernizing its air force and air defense. Despite widespread reports that Syria was fairly punctual with its payments, fulfillment of most of the contracts was clearly dragged out; moreover, in most cases it was clearly dragged out by Russia for political reasons and the contract for the MiG-31E was cancelled. In 2012 it was reported that Russia had suspended the delivery to Syria of the first batch of the S-300PMU-2 systems. As a result, it is estimated that so far Syria has received shipments of approximately one billion dollars of the aforementioned amount, of which 560 million dollars worth were shipped in 2011. This constitutes 5% of Russian defense exports in 2011, making Syria a significant but far from key recipient of Russian arms.

Owing to Russian procrastination on a number of shipments, their commercial profitability for the producers is questionable. According to our estimates, in 2012 Syria will receive another 500 million dollars worth of Russian arms at the very most, unless shipments of MiG-29M/M2 fighters and S-300PMU2 air defense missile systems start at the end of the year.

It is noteworthy that Russian did not sell Syria such weapons systems as the Iskander-E missile system, and has not fulfilled the contract for MiG-31E interceptors and S-300MPU2 air defense missile systems. Thus, from the very beginning Russia has conducted a policy of refusing to sign any weapons deals with Syria which Israel and the West would find very objectionable; essentially it has never been prepared to supply Damascus with the most powerful weapons systems. The restraint in shipping MANPADS to Syria as well as the general policy of delaying a number of military shipments to the country is apparently in the same vein.

It is obvious that from the very beginning Russia has subordinated its MTC with Syria to its political relations with the West, even to the detriment of its commercial interests and political ties with Damascus. For Russia, MTC with Syria does not have that great a significance either in the commercial or military-technical sense. If future shipments to Syria are disrupted, it is more than likely that Rosoboroneksport will be able to resell all the equipment ordered by the Syrians (above all the most expensive items – MiG-29M/M2 fighters, S-300MPU-2 and Buk-M2E air defense missile systems, and Pantsir-S1 systems) to third countries and minimize its own losses. If the Assad regime manages to suppress the uprising, then Syria, subjected to Western sanctions and seriously weakened economically, will scarcely be able to continue making major purchases of Russian arms under new contracts. In either case Russia cannot view Syria as an especially important partner in terms of MTC, and the impact of Russian military shipments to Damascus on Russia’s overall policy on Syria is probably insignificant.


The Facility in Tartus

The Russian Navy’s 720th supply and maintenance base in the Syrian port of Tartus has been in operation since 1977 (the agreement on its use was concluded in 1971), and at present it is the sole Russian military facility outside the borders of the former USSR. Although this facility is a major topic of Western speculation regarding Syria, its actual military and operational significance is quite negligible.

The supply and maintenance base in Tartus basically comprises two floating docks with a couple of warehouses, a barracks, and several buildings on the shore. On a permanent rotation basis in Tartus there is one of the Black Sea Fleet’s repair ship, which comes from Sevastopol for a six-month period. The shore complement of the base numbers no more than 50 seamen. The facility itself is completely unsuited as a permanent base and is designed only for brief port calls by no more than 1-2 vessels to resupply. The base lacks any defenses.

In general, the supply and maintenance base in Tartus has more symbolic than practical significance for the Russian Navy. The facility cannot provide support for the deployment of any kind of significant naval group in the Mediterranean Sea, and visits to it even by Russian vessels in the Mediterranean, according to available data, are made more for demonstrative purposes than out of a genuine need to replenish supplies.

The loss of the supply and maintenance base in Tartus would not have a serious impact on Russian naval activities. In all likelihood, the fate of the Tartus base, like the question of Syrian-Russian MTC, is far from being the main decisive motive in Russia’s policy on Syria; it is just one item on the total list of “Russian interests” in that country.


Russian motivation

Russian policy toward Syria essentially amounts to supporting the current Bashar Assad regime and preventing foreign military intervention to overthrow him under the Libyan scenario. It is essentially based on a fairly broad consensus in the political and academic communities and among the broader public. Russian President Putin is acting here in his customary role of implementer of a “firm” “consensus” policy “in defense of Russian interests” and “limiting the high-handedness of the West.”

Unquestionably, for Putin motives of preservation also play a role to some extent; his authoritarian regime is also encountering a groundswell of protest at home, and this protest finds political approval and support from the West. Putin cannot help but sympathize with Assad as a fellow authoritarian ruler fighting against “foreign interference in internal affairs.” However, as experience shows, Putin is too pragmatic and opportunistic to make such ideological credos the cornerstone of his policy.

What is most important here for the Russian authorities is precisely the existing consensus of the political and academic (“expert”) elite, which boils down to the demand to “not lose Syria.” It is widely believed in Russia that the collapse of the Assad regime would mean the final loss of Moscow’s last client and ally in the Middle East, the total loss of its last foothold in the regime, and the final rollback of even the illusory traces of former Soviet might there. Syria is looked upon as one of the last symbolic fragments of Soviet “superpower status” and the “great power” scepter inherited by Russia from the USSR. Western intervention in Syria (which Russia is unable to hinder by military means) will be looked upon as a deliberate trampling underfoot of one of the few symbols of Russia’s great-power status.

These views are reinforced by the pessimistic attitude prevailing in Russia toward the wave of “Arab revolutions” in the Middle East, both in general and toward the possible outcome of the Syrian revolution in particular. The overwhelming majority of Russian observers believe that the current events in Arab countries have led to the total destabilization of the region and opened the way for Islamists to seize power. In Moscow’s view, the only real alternative to Islamic influence in Arab countries is secular authoritarian regimes. They alone can counter the Islamic “street” by forcibly imposing modern civilizational and cultural standards on archaic Middle Eastern societies. Therefore the struggle in Arab countries, including Syria, is perceived as a struggle between “the people who wear ties and the people who don’t.” The sympathies of Russian society, which has long suffered from terrorism and extremism under Islamic slogans in the North Caucasus, is fully on the side of the “people with ties” here. Moscow views Assad not so much as a “bad” dictator as much as a leader fighting an upsurge of Islamic barbarism.

The active support for the uprising in Syria from such “luminaries” of democracy and “secular society” as Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and the Islamist government of present-day Turkey) only heightens deep suspicions in Russia regarding the Islamist nature of the current Syrian movement and the Middle Eastern movement in general. Russia has long been concerned about what it considers the Saudi export of Islamism of a radical Wahhabi stripe. And the obvious inter-religious and sectarian contradictions that are tearing Syria apart and playing a large role in the conflict there give rise to apprehensions that Syria may become “Lebanon writ large.”

Finally, a considerable role is also played by Russia’s traditional displeasure at the West’s unilateral interventionism, augmented by the general negative view of the actions by Western countries in Libya in 2011, with the patently loose interpretation by Western governments of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, or the outright violation of those resolutions for their own benefit (as happened with arms shipments to the Libyan insurgents). From Russia’s viewpoint, in Libya the Western countries, led by the U.S., demonstrated cynicism, treachery, and a typical policy of “double standards.” Therefore, the West’s moralistic homilies and appeals concerning Syria are perceived by Russian public opinion as yet another manifestation of cynical hypocrisy of the lowest kind.

The Syrian situation focuses all the main foreign policy bugbears, complexes, and phobias of Russian policy, the Russian elite, and Russian public opinion. In fact, the nature of the events in Syria itself is eclipsed here by fundamental Russian reflections (and reflexes!). Moreover, Putin, always striving to use these reflections for his own benefit, is now triply compelled to try squeezing everything possible out of them to bolster his political system. Moscow’s sober position regarding the crisis in Syria is therefore inevitable and there are no alternatives to it. This position is not entirely based on cold calculations of the benefits of shipping Russian arms to Damascus, not on the wish to retain Tartus, and not even on the desire to strike a deal behind the scene with the United States. This position is based on the conviction that the revolution in Syria, especially when supported by the intervention of Western and Arab states, will greatly harm Russian interests on a much broader scale.
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Stalin alza, limpia, construye, fortifica, preserva, mira, protege, alimenta, pero también castiga. Y esto es cuanto quería deciros, camaradas: hace falta el castigo. Pablo Neruda

Las ideas son más poderosas que las armas. Nosotros no dejamos que nuestros enemigos tengan armas, ¿por qué dejaríamos que tuvieran ideas?. Iosif V. D. Stalin

¡Cuando un pueblo enérgico y viril llora, la injusticia tiembla! Fidel Castro Ruz
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« Respuesta #395 : 16 Septiembre 2012, 15:10:08 »

Saludos

En este vídeo se ve perfectamente un cohete S-5KP de 55 mm ...

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... sin la cabeza de combate.

UN SALUDO
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Miroslav Lokar
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« Respuesta #396 : 18 Septiembre 2012, 09:47:40 »

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"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
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Kosovo je Srbija


« Respuesta #397 : 25 Septiembre 2012, 08:38:39 »

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"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
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« Respuesta #398 : 27 Septiembre 2012, 21:05:52 »

Esto es mala señal para los rebeldes (si es que es verdad):

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Saludos.
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« Respuesta #399 : 27 Septiembre 2012, 21:24:09 »

Saludos

Hay una ensalada de ideologías basadas en interpretaciones religiosas, étnias..., entre los rebeldes que hace complicada la "piña".

Aparte, hay una pila de informaciones que los medios generales no recogen pero que dejan patente que los ajustes de cuentas entre los dirigentes rebeldes están a la orden del día.

Han pasado meses desde que comenzó el jaleo y no se notan los avances de los rebeldes. Tampoco es que haya algo que sirva para demostrar que el gobierno recupera posiciones pero es indebatible que siguen en la poltrona.

Alepo es la mejor muestra. Los rebeldes llevan meses intentando tomarla y no lo han conseguido.

Quizá se estén cansando de esa suerte de punto muerto en el que se encuentra el conflicto.

UN SALUDO
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Miroslav Lokar
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« Respuesta #400 : 29 Septiembre 2012, 23:54:28 »

Report: Turkish pilots killed by Assad, not crash

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« Última modificación: 30 Septiembre 2012, 00:04:23 por Miroslav Lokar » En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
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« Respuesta #401 : 30 Septiembre 2012, 00:06:03 »

Syrian loyalists repel rebel attack on Aleppo

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MICHAEL JANSEN

A FRONTAL assault launched by rebels in an attempt to regain lost ground in the northern city of Aleppo has dissolved into street-by-street fighting after Syrian army troops fiercely defended their positions.

Some rebel units were said to be surrounded, while others were obliged to retreat before entering the city.

State television said a number of “terrorists” had been killed and that rebel mortar fire in the southeast of the city had wounded 10 and killed three civilians, including two children.

The rebel Tawhid Brigade reportedly engaged pro-government Kurdish fighters in the Sheikh Maksoud neighbourhood adjacent to Ashrafiyeh, a large Kurdish quarter which had remained outside the conflict. The rebels can expect to meet strong resistance from the Kurds who have a local defence force organised by the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which can call on reinforcements from other Kurdish quarters and towns .

Rebel commanders had announced a “decisive battle” for Aleppo, Syria’s most populous city and commercial capital. Hundreds of rebels from independent and often sparring militias have united under the Free Syrian Army banner.

A rebel victory in loyalist Aleppo, which had been spared violence until late July, could give them control of a wide belt of territory extending northwards to the Turkish border. But a rebel defeat would represent a big psychological setback.

Activists said a warplane bombed a cluster of houses near Azaz, a rebel staging point one kilometre from the Turkish border, killing a number of people, while a shell fired across the border wounded a Turkish citizen.

Ground forces, supported by armour, also carried out house-to-house searches for fighters and weapons in the restive districts of Barzeh, Jabor and Qaboun north-east of Damascus. Soldiers clashed with insurgents in Yarmouk, a southern neighbourhood where 114,000 Palestinians live. Rebels have been trying to recruit Palestinian youths for many months, but the community has tried to stay out of the conflict.

The rebel offensive in Aleppo was timed to coincide with a meeting of the Friends of Syria in New York. The rebel objective appeared to be to demonstrate a capacity to operate under a unified command and retake strategic targets. The ad hoc gathering, hosted by US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, brought together members of the Syrian opposition and 20 ministers from the US, EU and Arab League on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Iraq, which supports Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, attended for the first time.

The aim of the meeting was to encourage the divided opposition to co-operate and formulate common objectives. Grassroots activists have called for greater humanitarian assistance and more pressure on the Assad regime.

Russia, China and Iran, which disagree with the approach of the western powers and their Arab allies, did not attend. Rivalries among permanent members the Security Council has meant deadlock over the Syrian crisis for more than a year.

US defence secretary Leon Panetta announced that Syria’s chemical weapons have been consolidated in secure locations under government control.

The UN Human Rights Council voted to extend its investigation into rights violations and condemned the “increasing number of massacres” in the country. A resolution, submitted by seven Arab members, condemned all violence in Syria.

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En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
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Kosovo je Srbija


« Respuesta #402 : 30 Septiembre 2012, 00:16:43 »

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En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
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Karma: 411
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Kosovo je Srbija


« Respuesta #403 : 30 Septiembre 2012, 01:04:08 »

اختراع. الثوار السوريون يستخدمون النقيفة لرمي القنابل

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En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
Miroslav Lokar
Moderator foro RKKА
Mariscal
*

Karma: 411
Mensajes: 3983


Kosovo je Srbija


« Respuesta #404 : 30 Septiembre 2012, 01:04:51 »

عملية كاسحة للجيش الحر:أسر وقتل لجنود بشار27-7/+18

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En línea

"Nosotros los pilotos tenemos el deber de repeler por lo menos la primera oleada de aviones enemigos y salvar por lo menos a un niño de nuestro país"

-Capitán Zoran Radosavljevic antes de partir en la que sería su última misión. Base Aérea de Batanjica, Belgrado, República Federal de Yugoslavia.

26 de marzo de 1999
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